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Does the London Stock Exchange require an Upstairs Market?  
Evidence from Block Trades 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Liquidity for large trades is provided by trading them through upstairs brokers. 
These brokers have the power to agree outside-the quote execution at times when 
liquidity in standard equity markets is lacking. The objective of the upstairs market is that 
it increases market liquidity because participants are granted flexibility to trade large 
transactions outside the bid and ask quotes. This is the case in a vast proportion of the 
major stock exchanges throughout the world. One notable exception is the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE), where all trades regardless of size are traded on a standard equity 
market, known as a downstairs market. In this paper we test if the LSE requires an 
upstairs market by examining the relationship between large trades and market liquidity 
for different trade sizes. Large trades are defined in the academic literature by Gregoriou 
(2008) as block trades, which are transactions of 10,000 shares or more. 
 
It is vital that we examine the relationship between block trade sizes and market 
liquidity, because block trades encapsulate over 60% of the entire trading volume in 
international equity markets.1 This is because institutional trades consist mainly of block 
transactions. Previous literature finds no international evidence of an association between 
the size of block trade and market liquidity. Madhavan and Cheng (1997) find no 
significant impact of block sizes on market liquidity in US equity markets. They attribute 
                                                 
1 The Financial Times, January 2006. 
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their findings to the liquidity gains via the execution of block trades through an upstairs 
market.  Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) re-affirm the Madhavan and Cheng 
(1997) findings for the French equity market. Chakravarty (2001) and Alzahrani et al 
(2013) also provide evidence that order size and execution results in corresponding trade 
price impact in developed (US) and developing (Saudi) stock markets.  
 
 The only study on the LSE on block size and market liquidity is provided by 
Gemmill (1996). He finds a nonlinear relationship between market liquidity and block 
size. This is because a large trade reduces the fixed trading cost per share due to 
economies of scale, but it increases both the risk-premium required on inventory and on 
the possibility of the transaction being based upon private information. The result is that 
market liquidity captured by bid-ask spreads at first decrease with block size and then 
increase, as the risk premium becomes significant. Therefore, the overall impact on 
market liquidity of trade size depends on the relative magnitude of the changes in these 
two components.2   
 
  The major shortcoming of all the existing literature on block trades and market 
liquidity is that block sizes are typically partitioned into categories of 10,000 to 20,000, 
20,000 to 50,000 and greater than 50,000 shares. The problem with this approach is that a 
significant proportion of block transactions (approximately 30% in the LSE) are greater 
than 50,000 shares. The considerable variation in block sizes, suggest that the coefficient 
representing 50,000 shares or more, may not provide reliable estimates of the relationship 
between market liquidity and block size for large block trades. In addition to concealing 
                                                 
2 There is a vast amount of academic literature on block trades in general over the last twenty years.  These 
studies are not mentioned in this paper due to irrelevance in determining the relationship between block 
size and market liquidity. 
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block size information, the effect of pooling all block trades with sizes in excess of 
50,000 shares, is that the pooled effects may not even provide consistent estimates of the 
average (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). This is of particular importance in the LSE because 
there is no upstairs market to capture hidden liquidity achieved by executing block trades 
outside the bid and ask quotes.  
 
In this paper we test the validity of the pooling assumption of block trade sizes in 
the LSE. The objective is to determine whether the partitioning of block sizes in the 
previous literature provides a true representation of the empirical relationship between 
the size of block trades and market liquidity in the LSE. The test results suggest that the 
pooling hypothesis cannot be rejected for the categories of 10,000 to 20,000, and 20,000 
to 50,000 shares. However, we find overwhelming evidence that block trades of 50,000 
shares or more cannot be pooled. Further econometric analysis reveals that liquidity is 
dramatically reduced for large block transactions consisting of trades in excess of 
500,000 shares. Our empirical findings suggest that the LSE may require a specialist 
upstairs market which obtains liquidity for large block transactions, by allowing trading 
to occur outside the market makers’ ask and bid quotes.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The following section discusses the 
econometric specification; Section 3 discusses data and the tests of poolability; section 4 
presents the empirical results; and section 5 summarises and concludes. 
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2.   Econometric Specification  
 
In order to conduct our empirical analysis we follow the mainstream literature on 
block trades and liquidity by estimating a similar model to Heflin and Shaw (2000). We 
augment their econometric specification by incorporating a block size variable in a 
multivariate testable relationship of the following form:3 
 , 0 1 2 3 4
v ol
j i i i i i i iS Size P M Vλ λ λ λ λ ε= + + + + + .      (1) 
 
Where, Sj denotes the different measures of market liquidity ( )1,...,3 ;j =  and i represents 
each block trade that was executed on the LSE in 2010. We proxy market liquidity 
through three measures of bid-ask spread, namely, the relative bid-ask spread, the 
effective bid-ask spread and the Huang and Stoll (1997) measure of the adverse selection 
cost component of bid-ask spread.4 A brief discussion of these liquidity measures and 
their computational details are given in section 3. ,  ,   and V OLSize P M V  correspondingly 
denote block size, share prices, market value of the company, and stock market volatility. 
Share price is the execution price of the block trade; firm size is the market value of the 
firm’s common equity; stock market volatility is proxied by the rolling (fortnightly) 
standard deviation of stock return. All the variables are expressed in natural logarithms in 
                                                 
3 We prefer to estimate the Heflin and Shaw (2000) rather than the Gemmill (1996) model, because they 
include relevant statistically significant control variables in the empirical specification of market liquidity 
and block size in a multivariate framework.    
4We use liquidity to represent a proxy for trading costs. We accept that there are alternative measures of 
trading costs such as commission charges paid to traders. However, commission data is very subjective and 
is also not available for block trades as far as we are aware. Therefore like all the previous literature on 
market microstructure, we use liquidity to approximate transaction costs of block trades.  
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order to minimize the impact of excess skewness and kurtosis in the data.5 In 
specification (1), a negative and significant 1λ  for all bid-ask spreads (liquidity) imply 
that block trades, increase market liquidity because large trades reduce the fixed trading 
cost per share due to economies of scale. On the other hand, a positive and significant 1λ  
for all bid-ask spread (liquidity) suggests that block trades decrease market liquidity by 
increasing the risk premium required on inventory and/or the risk of trading with 
informed agents for market makers.  
 
3.   Data Description and Block Size Heterogeneity 
 
3.1  Dataset  
 
Our sample consists of all block trades defined as transactions of 10,000 shares or 
more, executed on the LSE in 2010. There are 2.32 million intraday observations. Several 
filters are applied to the block trades and quotes.6 We obtain all our data directly from the 
LSE.7 We use three bid-ask spread measures to proxy the liquidity of block trades. The 
first measure is the relative bid-ask spread defined as the ask price minus the bid price 
divided by the average of the bid and ask prices. Given that approximately 20% of the 
block trades in our sample occur within the bid and ask quotes we compute the effective 
spread, the second measure of liquidity.  
The effective spread is measured as twice the absolute value of the difference 
between a transaction price and the midpoint of the bid and asks quotes at the time of 
transaction. Extensive theoretical literature (see among others Huang and Stoll, 1997 and 
                                                 
5 The descriptive statistics showing excess skewness and kurtosis on the raw data are available from the 
authors upon request. 
6 We eliminate trades with negative or zero bid-ask spreads. This is because these block trades have not 
actually been traded.  
7 We would like to thank the LSE for providing us with the dataset. 
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Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans, 1997) decomposes trading costs into its non-
information and information components. The non-information component comprises the 
direct costs of inventory holding and order processing while the information component 
is associated with the costs of asymmetric information. The latter is commonly known as 
the adverse selection costs of trading. Its isolation and use in modelling market liquidity 
reveals the magnitude of the influence of asymmetric information on trading costs. 
 
We compute the adverse selection component of total trading costs following the 
method of Huang and Stoll (1997, henceforth HS).8 The HS adverse selection component 
is computed by estimating the following regression by ordinary least squares at firm 
level: 
 
1 2 1 3 , 1t t t A t tprice Q Q Qβ β β ε− −∆ = + + +      (2) 
 
 
Where tprice∆  represents the change in the transaction price prior to the quoted spread at 
time t ; ,i tQ  equals 1 (-1) if the trade is a sell (buy) at time t . Following Heflin and Shaw 
(2000) we use a “combined” buy/sell indicator, , 1A tQ −  , which equals 1 (-1, 0) if the sum 
of , 1i tQ −  across all the block trades is positive (negative, zero) to capture the market-wide 
pressure on the inventory cost component of the bid-ask spread. Assuming that the 
                                                 
8 One possible limitation of the present study is that alternative spread decomposition models were not 
considered. However, as pointed out by Van Ness et al (2001) all spread decomposition models yield very 
similar results. 
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number of block purchases and sales are equal, the estimated information cost component 
of the bid-ask spread is equal to ( )2 12 .β β+ 9 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the block trade sizes analyzed in this 
study. The overall sample consists of 2,323,250 block trades, of which 1,233,124 are 
block purchases and 1,094,356 are block sales. The sample is extremely large when 
compared to previous studies on market liquidity and block size. For example Madhavan 
and Cheng (1997) examined 16,343 US blocks while Gemmill (1996) analyzed 5,987 
blocks on the LSE. The average size of purchase (£4.33 million) is slightly smaller than 
the average size of sales (4.66 million). We also witness that block trades account for 62 
and 59 percent of the equity of the firms in our sample for purchases and sales, 
respectively. This further highlights the importance of block trades in the LSE.10   
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
3.2   Block Size Heterogeneity 
 
The distribution of sizes of block trades for our sample can be witnessed in Table 
2. We observe that block trades are extremely heterogeneous across sizes. The most 
important characteristic is that approximately 30% of total trading volume in block 
trades, stem from block transactions in excess of 50,000 shares, with a vast proportion 
(18%) coming from block trades of 500,000 shares or more. It is, therefore, vital to 
formally test if it is valid to pool the dataset and estimate a single block trade and 
                                                 
9 Huang and Stoll (1997) develop a technique using an estimated trade reversal probability as an alternative 
to the aggregate buy/sell indicator but this measure can produce negative empirical estimates of the 
information cost component of the bid-ask spread. Hence, we follow Heflin and Shaw (2000) to decompose 
spread utilizing the aggregate buy/sell indicator.  
10 Note we have descriptive statistics for all the other variables displayed in Equation (1). These are not 
reported because the main focus of the paper is on the heterogeneity of block trade sizes. However, the 
authors are happy to provide the descriptive statistics for all the other variables upon request.  
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liquidity relationship for large block trades, where large block trades are defined as trades 
in excess of 50,000 shares by the previous literature. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
We investigate data poolability through the tests of parameter homogeneity. We estimate 
Equation (1) and test the null of parameter ( 1λ ) equality for trade sizes between 10,000 to 
20,000 shares, 20,000 to 50,000 shares and shares in excess of 50,000. We explicitly test 
poolability across these categories because the previous literature always partitions block 
trades into one of the three size groups. If the null hypothesis is not rejected across the 
sample of categories, then that forms a basis for pooling the block size data because this 
essentially implies homogeneity in the block trade and liquidity relationship within each 
trade size group. We then test for the null of group-wise error homocsedasticity treating 
each trade size category as a separate entity. A rejection of group-wise homoscedasticity 
indicates that the block trade size category heterogeneity is dynamic.  
 
Chow F tests under the null of parameter equality across trade sizes between 
10,000 to 20,000 shares, 20,000 to 50,000 shares and shares in excess of 50,000 are 
reported in Table 3. We observe that the null hypothesis is accepted across trade sizes 
between 10,000 to 20,000 shares and 20,000 to 50,000 shares, but is rejected for shares in 
excess of 50,000. The results remain intact for all three measures of liquidity. Hence, the 
parameters of Equation (1) are different across large block trades. The LM tests of group-
wise homoscedasticity are also reported in Table 3, which confirm that error variances 
across small and medium block trade transactions (10,000 to 20,000 and 20,000 to 50,000 
shares) are the same (i.e., homoscedastic), whereas large block trades in excess of 50,000 
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shares have significantly different error variances across the trades  (i.e., heteroscedastic). 
Thus, the elasticity of block liquidity (spreads) with respect to block trade size for large 
transactions is different; the error dynamics across large block transactions are also 
significantly different. These results hold across all three measures of spreads. 
Consequently, there is overwhelming evidence that large block transactions of 50,000 
shares or more cannot be pooled in the LSE. This implies that a single regression 
examining the empirical association between the liquidity and size of block trades is 
suitable across small and medium transactions, but is not applicable to block trades in 
excess of 50,000 shares.   
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Motivated by the block trade size distribution results displayed in Table 2, we allocate 
each large block transaction of 50,000 shares or more into four groups, which are defined 
as 50,000-100,000 shares, 100,000-500,000 shares, 500,000-1,000,000 shares, and shares 
in excess of 1,000,000.  
 
Chow F tests under the null of parameter equality across the decomposition of the 
large block transactions between 50,000 to 100,000 shares, 100,000 to 500,000 shares, 
500,000 to 1,000,000 shares and shares in excess of 1,000,000 are reported in Table 4. 
We observe that the null hypothesis is accepted across all the decompositions of large 
block trade sizes, for all three measures of liquidity. Hence, the parameters of Equation 
(1) are the same across all large block trades. The LM tests of group-wise 
homoscedasticity are also reported in Table 4, which confirm that error variances across 
all large block trade transactions are the same (i.e., homoscedastic). Thus, the elasticity of 
block liquidity (spreads) with respect to block trade size across large transactions is not 
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significantly different. Therefore it is appropriate to run a single regression of block size 
and liquidity for block trades across the four groups of large block transactions that are 
displayed above.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
 
 
 
 
4.   Empirical Results  
 
As a result of the parameter equality results across different block trade sizes 
displayed in Table 3, we initially provide empirical estimates of Equation 1 for trade 
sizes between 10,000 to 20,000 shares and 20,000 to 50,000 shares. The results (reported 
in Table 5) indicate a negative relationship between block sizes and the bid-ask spread. 
This implies that as a result of increasing economies of scale from the trading of a vast 
quantity of shares at any given time, market makers reduce the bid-ask spread. The 
results also suggest that market makers do not reduce spreads due to their possible 
dealings with uninformed traders, because the negative relationship between block trade 
sizes and the bid-ask spread remains intact for the adverse selection component of the 
bid-ask spread. The control variables are all highly significant with the hypothesized sign. 
Market value of the company appears negative and significant suggesting that the larger 
the companies the lower tends to be the spread of block trades. We also find some 
evidence that as we raise the size of the trade that the magnitude of the market value 
coefficient increases in real terms. This suggests that larger trades are associated with 
larger companies, which is logical as institutional trades are associated with the largest 
companies listed on the FTSE. Stock return volatility appears positive and significant 
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suggesting that increased return volatility increases the costs of block trading. We find 
weak evidence that the degree of the stock return volatility coefficient escalates as the 
trade size increases, which implies that there is a bigger risk when investors are trading 
larger quantities of stock. This is consistent with market microstructure theory as the 
inventory holding costs increase as you trade larger amounts of equity. Share price 
appears negative and significant which suggests a decrease in trading costs during stock 
market rally. There is strong evidence that the magnitude of the negative association 
between share prices and liquidity is enhanced when trade size goes up. This suggests 
that there is a decrease in transaction costs due to momentum trading.  Finally, the 
residuals are normally distributed for all empirical models suggesting that our 
econometric estimates are not due to outliers in the data.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
Based on the poolability results displayed in Table 4, we display the econometric 
estimates of Equation 1 for trade sizes between 50,000 to 100,000 shares and 100,000 to 
500,000 shares, 500,000 to 1,000,000 and in excess of 1,000,000 shares in Table 6. We 
find that the trade size variable is positive and highly significant at all conventional 
levels. This suggests that there is a positive relationship between the block size and the 
bid-ask spread. Our results indicate that for large block transactions there is a lack of 
liquidity in the market due to the difficulty that market makers face in attracting counter 
parties for the execution of trades. This encourages market makers to increase the bid-ask 
spread in order to receive adequate compensation for the risk in not being able to execute 
trades. The findings are driven by a lack of liquidity rather than market makers dealing 
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with informed traders, because the positive relationship continues to exist when we look 
at the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. We also find that the magnitude 
of the block size coefficient increases with the size of the trade. This indicates that the 
larger the block size, the less liquidity in the financial market. The significance and sign 
of the control variables displayed in Table 5 remain intact. Finally, the normality in the 
residuals shows that our findings are not due to outliers in the data.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
5.   Conclusion 
 
It is a common feature in international equity markets that large transactions 
defined in the academic literature as block trades, are traded on an upstairs market. This 
enables market makers to obtain liquidity by negotiating transaction prices outside the bid 
and ask quotes, due to a lack in the liquidity for these large trades in the financial 
markets.  A notable exception to the presence of an upstairs market is the London Stock 
Exchange. This is because block trades are traded like any standard share in a 
conventional equity market, known as a downstairs market. In this paper we directly test 
whether the London Stock Exchange requires an upstairs market for the execution of 
block trades. We do this by testing if different block sizes can be pooled. Our findings 
provide overwhelming evidence that large block trades cannot be pooled. This suggests 
that they should be analyzed in different categories to the rest of the block trades.  
 
Our econometric analysis of the empirical relationship between block trade sizes 
and market liquidity reveals on the one hand, that for block transactions of 50,000 shares 
or less, there is a negative relationship between the size of the trade and market liquidity. 
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On the other hand, for block trades in excess of 50,000 shares, there is a positive 
association between the size of the trade and market liquidity. We show that for small and 
medium block trades, liquidity is enhanced due to the increasing economies of scale that 
market makers are faced with as a result of trading large quantities of shares. For large 
block trades, there is a positive relationship between market liquidity and the size of a 
trade. This is because market makers increase the bid-ask spread in order to receive 
adequate compensation for the risk of not being able to execute trades, due to lack of 
liquidity in the market. We also find that the magnitude of the block size coefficient 
increases with the size of the trade. This indicates that the larger the block size, the less 
liquidity in the financial market. Finally, we demonstrate that informed trades are not 
driving the changes in market liquidity. Our empirical findings imply that for larger 
transactions in excess of 50,000 shares, liquidity could be enhanced if a specialist upstairs 
market is implemented on the London Stock Exchange. However, as pointed out by 
Christie et al (1994) even in the presence of an upstairs market on the NASDAQ, 
liquidity can be low due to the collusion of market makers in order to maintain wider bid-
ask spreads of block trades.  
 
An interesting avenue for further research would be to establish a block trade size that 
would solicit upstairs market intervention for liquidity. If the ideal block size can be 
found, then a possibility exists that this block size could serve as the optimal large block 
for the London Stock Exchange and other global stock markets to create their units for 
institutional traders. Frequent intervention by specialists for liquidity supply is expensive 
and may cause unforeseen disruption due to large transactions. If securities can be 
designed to avoid liquidity shock-injection, smoothness of block trading may resume 
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without an outsider’s help. This would promote the trading market to dictate supply and 
demand of large block trades. A formal investigation on the optimal block trade size for 
the adoption of an upstairs market would provide a substantial contribution to the 
literature on market microstructure of institutional trades.11  
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TABLES 
 
 
TABLE 1 Summary Statistics of Block Trades in the London Stock Exchange 
 
This table reports summary statistics in millions of pounds for all block trades defined as trades of 10,000 
shares or more executed on the London Stock Exchange in 2010.  
   
Block Trade Buy Sell 
Number of Block Trades (£ million) 1.23 1.094 
Mean (£ thousand) 42.987 40.123 
Medium (£ thousand) 37.826 34.675 
Minimum (£ thousand) 10 10 
Maximum (£ million) 13.6 15.4 
Standard Deviation (£ thousand) 36.1 37.1 
Average Block Value (£ million) 4.33 4.66 
Number of Trades of all Sizes 
(£ million) 
1.98 1.84 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. Block Trade Size Distribution in the London Stock Exchange 
 
This table reports the cumulative distribution of all block trades defined as trades of 10,000 shares or more 
executed on the London Stock Exchange in 2010.  
 
No of Trades Percentage of Total Block Trades Cumulative Percentage  
10,000-20,000 40 40 
20,000-50,000 30 70 
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50,000-100,000 5 75 
100,000-500,000 7 82 
500,000-1,000,000 10 92 
> 1,000,000 8 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3: Heterogeneous Liquidity Effects of Block Trade Sizes on the London 
Stock Exchange 
The specification is , 0 1 2 3 4
v ol
j i i i i i i iS Size P M Vλ λ λ λ λ ε= + + + + + . Where, Sj denotes the different measures 
of market liquidity (j=1,..,3); and i represents each block trade that was executed on the LSE in 2010. We 
proxy market liquidity through three measures of bid-ask spread, namely, the relative bid-ask spread, the 
effective bid-ask spread and the Huang and Stoll (1997) measure of the adverse selection cost component 
of bid-ask spread. Size, P, MV and VOL correspondingly denote block size, share prices, market value of the 
company, and stock market volatility. Share price is the execution price of the block trade; firm size is the 
market value of the firm’s common equity; stock market volatility is proxied by the rolling (fortnightly) 
standard deviation of stock return. All the variables are expressed in natural logarithms in order to 
minimize the impact of excess skewness and kurtosis in the data.  The cross-size parameter equality (i.e., 
the equality of λs across the categories of different block sizes) is tested by the standard (Chow type) F-
tests, and error variance equality across the different trade size categories is conducted with the use of 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests of homogeneity.  Figures in brackets represent the p-values of the F and chi 
squared statistics, which are obtained through bootstrap simulations, given the lack of availability of 
suitable critical values from statistical tables due to our large sample size. * denote statistical significance at 
all conventional levels. 
 
Panel A. Parameter Equality (F Test) 
 
No of Trades Relative 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Adverse 
Selection 
10,000-20,000 25.32 (0.63) 29.32 (0.55) 34.56 (0.50) 
20,000-50,000 34.65 (0.77) 38.99 (0.50) 42.30 (0.42) 
>50,000 2740 (0.00)* 2813 (0.00)* 2870 (0.00)* 
 
 
Panel B. Parameter Variance Equality (LM Test) 
 
No of Trades Relative 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Adverse 
Selection 
10,000-20,000 32.43 (0.58) 39.44 (0.50) 44.66 (0.48) 
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20,000-50,000 33.88 (0.72) 40.21 (0.58) 46.39 (0.48) 
>50,000 3343 (0.00)* 3013 (0.00)* 3170 (0.00)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: Heterogeneous Liquidity Effects of Large Block Trade Sizes on the 
London Stock Exchange 
The specification is , 0 1 2 3 4
v ol
j i i i i i i iS Size P M Vλ λ λ λ λ ε= + + + + + . Where, Sj denotes the different measures 
of market liquidity (j=1,..,3); and i represents each block trade that was executed on the LSE in 2010. We 
proxy market liquidity through three measures of bid-ask spread, namely, the relative bid-ask spread, the 
effective bid-ask spread and the Huang and Stoll (1997) measure of the adverse selection cost component 
of bid-ask spread. Size, P, MV and VOL correspondingly denote block size, share prices, market value of the 
company, and stock market volatility. Share price is the execution price of the block trade; firm size is the 
market value of the firm’s common equity; stock market volatility is proxied by the rolling (fortnightly) 
standard deviation of stock return. All the variables are expressed in natural logarithms in order to 
minimize the impact of excess skewness and kurtosis in the data.  The cross-size parameter equality (i.e., 
the equality of λs across the categories of different block sizes) is tested by the standard (Chow type) F-
tests, and error variance equality across the different trade size categories is conducted with the use of 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests of homogeneity. Figures in brackets represent the p-values of the F and chi 
squared statistics, which are obtained through bootstrap simulations, given the lack of availability of 
suitable critical values from statistical tables due to our large sample size. * denote statistical significance at 
all conventional levels. 
 
  
Panel A. Parameter Equality (F Test) 
 
No of Trades Relative 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Adverse 
Selection 
50,000-100,000 17.63 (0.77) 19.32 (0.70) 25.56 (0.62) 
100,000-500,000 22.65 (0.82) 30.24 (0.58) 38.40 (0.46) 
500,000-1000000 22.98 (0.74) 25.56 (0.76) 27.89 (0.80) 
>1000000 24.56 (0.72) 22.34 (0.76)          20.12 (0.84) 
 
 
Panel B. Parameter Variance Equality (LM Test) 
 
No of Trades Relative Effective Adverse 
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Spread Spread Selection 
50,000-100,000 22.43 (0.64) 39.44 (0.50) 44.66 (0.48) 
100,000-500,000 30.80 (0.70) 32.21 (0.72) 32.00 (0.55) 
500,000-1000000 33.43 (0.64) 30.10 (0.60) 30.56 (0.61) 
>1000000 20.22 (0.80) 18.30 (0.79)          20.98 (0.85) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5:  Liquidity Effects and Small Block Trade Sizes on the London Stock 
Exchange 
The specification is , 0 1 2 3 4
v ol
j i i i i i i iS Size P M Vλ λ λ λ λ ε= + + + + + . Where, Sj denotes the different measures 
of market liquidity (j=1,..,3); and i represents each block trade that was executed on the LSE in 2010. We 
proxy market liquidity through three measures of bid-ask spread, namely, the relative bid-ask spread, the 
effective bid-ask spread and the Huang and Stoll (1997) measure of the adverse selection cost component 
of bid-ask spread. Size, P, MV and VOL correspondingly denote block size, share prices, market value of the 
company, and stock market volatility. Share price is the execution price of the block trade; firm size is the 
market value of the firm’s common equity; stock market volatility is proxied by the rolling (fortnightly) 
standard deviation of stock return. SE is the standard error of the regression and Norm (2) is the Jacque 
Bera normality test of the residuals. All the variables are expressed in natural logarithms in order to 
minimize the impact of excess skewness and kurtosis in the data.  Figures in brackets are p-values and * 
denote statistical significance at all conventional levels. 
 
 
Panel A. Block Trade Size, 10,000-20,000 Shares  
 
Regressors Relative Spread Effective Spread Adverse Selection 
0iλ  
0.004 
(0.00)* 
0.121 
(0.00)* 
0.133 
(0.00)* 
1λ  
-0.125 
(0.00)* 
-0.134 
(0.00)* 
-0.140 
(0.00)* 
2λ  
-0.690 
(0.00)* 
-0.888 
(0.00)* 
-0.922 
(0.00)* 
3λ  
 -0.122 
(0.00)* 
-0.234 
(0.00)* 
-0.301 
(0.00)* 
4λ  
0.072 
(0.00)* 
0.099 
(0.00)* 
0.055 
(0.00)* 
2R  0.598 0.622 0.501 
SE 0.475 0.501 0.343 
NORM (2) (0.343) (0.380) (0.401) 
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Panel B. Block Trade Size, 20,000-50,000 Shares  
 
Regressors Relative Spread  Effective Spread Adverse Selection 
0iλ  
0.009 
(0.00)* 
0.133 
(0.00)* 
0.124 
(0.00)* 
1λ  
-0.173 
(0.00)* 
-0.155 
(0.00)* 
-0.132 
(0.00)* 
2λ  
-0.822 
(0.00)* 
-0.732 
(0.00)* 
-0.833 
(0.00)* 
3λ  
 -0.133 
(0.00)* 
-0.133 
(0.00)* 
-0.222 
(0.00)* 
4λ  
0.099 
(0.00)* 
0.077 
(0.00)* 
0.044 
(0.00)* 
2R  0.623 0.403 0.444 
SE 0.522 0.534 0.400 
NORM (2) (0.444) (0.301) (0.433) 
 
 
 
TABLE 6:  Liquidity Effects and Large Block Trade Sizes on the London Stock 
Exchange 
The specification is , 0 1 2 3 4
v ol
j i i i i i i iS Size P M Vλ λ λ λ λ ε= + + + + + . Where, Sj denotes the different measures 
of market liquidity (j=1,..,3); and i represents each block trade that was executed on the LSE in 2010. We 
proxy market liquidity through three measures of bid-ask spread, namely, the relative bid-ask spread, the 
effective bid-ask spread and the Huang and Stoll (1997) measure of the adverse selection cost component 
of bid-ask spread. Size, P, MV and VOL correspondingly denote block size, share prices, market value of the 
company, and stock market volatility. Share price is the execution price of the block trade; firm size is the 
market value of the firm’s common equity; stock market volatility is proxied by the rolling (fortnightly) 
standard deviation of stock return. SE is the standard error of the regression and Norm (2) is the Jacque 
Bera normality test of the residuals. All the variables are expressed in natural logarithms in order to 
minimize the impact of excess skewness and kurtosis in the data.  Figures in brackets are p-values and * 
denote statistical significance at all conventional levels. 
 
Panel A. Block Trade Size, 50,000-100,000 Shares  
 
Regressors Relative Spread Effective Spread Adverse Selection 
0iλ  
0.333 
(0.00)* 
0.226 
(0.00)* 
0.356 
(0.00)* 
1λ  
0.433 
(0.00)* 
0.321 
(0.00)* 
0.488 
(0.00)* 
2λ  
-0.211 
(0.00)* 
-0.333 
(0.00)* 
-0.410 
(0.00)* 
3λ  
 -0.243 
(0.00)* 
-0.356 
(0.00)* 
-0.421 
(0.00)* 
4λ  
0.088 
(0.00)* 
0.032 
(0.00)* 
0.022 
(0.00)* 
2R  0.321 0.346 0.401 
SE 0.566 0.433 0.300 
NORM (2) (0.222) (0.200) (0.282) 
 
Panel B. Block Trade Size, 100,000-500,000 Shares  
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Regressors Relative Spread Effective Spread Adverse Selection 
0iλ  
0.942 
(0.00)* 
0.742 
(0.00)* 
0.833 
(0.00)* 
1λ  
0.611 
(0.00)* 
0.400 
(0.00)* 
0.780 
(0.00)* 
2λ  
-0.413 
(0.00) 
-0.140 
(0.00)* 
-0.118 
(0.00)* 
3λ  
-0.152 
(0.00)* 
-0.242 
(0.00)* 
-0.168 
(0.00)* 
4λ  
0.508 
(0.00)* 
0.490 
(0.00)* 
0.310 
(0.00)* 
2R  0.577  
0.443 
 
0.222 
 
SE 0.322 0.367 0.301 
NORM (2) (0.321) (0.411) (0.501) 
 
 
 
Panel C. Block Trade Size, 500,000-1,000,000 Shares  
 
Regressors Relative Spread Effective Spread Adverse Selection 
0iλ  
0.014 
(0.00)* 
0.450 
(0.00)* 
0.017 
(0.00)* 
1λ  
0.788 
(0.00)* 
0.823 
(0.00)* 
0.924 
(0.00)* 
2λ  
-0.290 
(0.00)* 
-0.303 
(0.00)* 
-0.285 
(0.00)* 
3λ  
-0.078 
(0.00)* 
-0.114 
(0.00)* 
-0.071 
(0.00)* 
4λ  
0.078 
(0.00)* 
0.072 
(0.00)* 
0.079 
(0.00)* 
2R  0.507 0.518 0.605 
SE 0.321 0.343 0.282 
NORM (2) (0.556) (0.621) (0.643) 
 
 
Panel D. Block Trade Size, > 1,000,000 Shares  
 
Regressors Relative Spread Effective Spread Adverse Selection 
0iλ  
0.033 
(0.00)* 
0.058 
(0.00)* 
0.110 
(0.00)* 
1λ  
1.157 
(0.00)* 
1.263 
(0.00)* 
1.376 
(0.00)* 
2λ  
-0.485 
(0.00)* 
-0.521 
(0.00)* 
-0.601 
(0.00)* 
3λ  
-0.716 
(0.00)* 
-0.824 
(0.00)* 
-0.967 
(0.00)* 
4λ  
0.800 
(0.00)* 
0.830 
(0.00)* 
0.949 
(0.00)* 
2R  0.622 0.593 0.612 
SE 0.383 0.401 0.484 
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NORM (2) (0.633) (0.676) (0.584) 
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